Regulatory reform in public transport has become one of important issues in many countries, in order to improve efficiency and provide better services to users. Since regulatory reform will bring about institutional and structure changes of the organization, then it will imply the way of the public transport services regulated and managed.
INTRODUCTION
Recently, many local public transport agencies are trying to improve efficiency and provide better services of their public transport. Regulatory reform is one of growing options for these purposes. Indeed, there are various underlying reasons which are confronted by them each, such as the reducing of government funding for public sector, the changes of regulations in the provision of public transport, or other reasons concerned with the improvement of services quantity and quality.
The extensive evidence internationally showed that subsidized public transport services, provided on a monopoly basis by government's operators in both developed and less developed countries tended to become inefficient 1) . They were partial to produce services for more than necessary (at above competitive rates), and service quality was often inferior 2) . The experiences when such services were opened to competition, usually through a competitive tendering and contracting process, were that substantial cost savings were achieved 3) . In the mean time, the using of deregulated system in the provision of public transport in some large cities, showed the drawbacks in several aspects, mainly related to the market failure 4) . In many countries, governments are pushing for the introduction of competition in the organization of public services and more broadly in public procurement 5) . The development of public-private partnerships around the world is a good illustration of this trend 6) . Moreover, the emerging of new hybrid model which is implemented in some countries around the world over the last three decades has been one of alternative choices in the provision of public transport service. In other word, a model of which the public and private sectors share responsibility in delivering the service 7) . The service contract system is one of the growing trends under hybrid model. The main feature of the system which is intended here is that the public transport services are planned by a public agency, and procured from business enterprises under service contracts, often with competitive tendering 8) . In addition, although this system works under contract agreement between government as authority and business enterprises as operators but then authority takes active responsibility for planning of the service. This paper focuses on discussing of this kind of system. In a rather simpler way, the term of service contract system will then be used to represent such a system hereafter.
In view of the regulatory reform is a process of change, it will bring about the institutional changes or rule of the game, even in public transport sector. Consequently the functions of each stakeholder would also be changed. The new institutional setting including the applying of service contract system creates new roles for all actors to run the system. This will also change the structure of the public transport organization itself. Thus, in the context of public transport service, it will imply and influence the way of the services to be provided, so become important to organize it within an efficient manner.
This paper studies how the public bus transport service is organized in such an organizational form, as explained previously. The two cases, both London's and Seoul's model are used as illustration. It is preceded by explaining the shifts toward the service contracts system in those cities respective. This is then followed by highlighting the organizing of public bus transport services under such systems in the cities, which covers some aspects namely planning, operating, and monitoring. In turn, it could be worthwhile as input for local public transport in conducting regulatory reform.
THE SHIFTS TOWARD SERVICE CONTRACTS SYSTEM IN LONDON AND SEOUL
Both London's and Seoul's cases are interesting to study since they had difference backgrounds in introducing the service contracts system into their public transport service. Moreover, their previous systems in the provision of public transport service were different each other. In case of London, its regulatory framework in public transport has evolved over the last three decades. It has moved toward new system by introducing competitive tendering and undertaking the privatization of its publicly owned bus company gradually. It was very different from the Seoul's experience in conducting its innovative public transport reform, which was prepared in a short time, only around two years, before going into operation in the year 2004.
In historical perspective on regulatory reform of the bus industry, the United Kingdom led the way in significantly deregulating the urban and rural public transport market when it introduced the 1985 Transport Act 9) . Under the Act there are two distinct systems in providing public bus transport services through all The United Kingdom. The provision of public bus transport services for local and regional areas outside London is on the basis of unregulated system. This means that the initiative to run public bus transport services for passenger comes from private companies. They can apply and choose routes, arrange timetable and fare to be charged, based on a commercial basis.
At variance with outside London, bus service in London is operated by private bus companies as operators, which work under contract to London Buses (LB), a subsidiary of Transport for London (TfL). In addition, TfL is a functional body that responsible for delivering the Mayor of London's Transport Strategies. LB manages bus services, by planning routes, specifying service levels and ensuring the quality of services, and also responsible for providing other support services, such as bus stations, and bus stops. The contracts are awarded to private companies through a competitive tendering process, as a selection mechanism.
Previously, the provision of London's public bus service was a publicly owned and subsidized bus operation. Its service operation was an increasingly costly public monopoly at that time. Under the London Regional Transport Act 1984, London Transport (LT), which was then replaced by a new organization called TfL in 2000, was required to set up subsidiary companies to run both bus and underground. It was also demanded to introduce competitive tendering to ensure LT operated economically and required less financial assistance from public funds. In 1985 LT set up a subsidiary known as London Buses Limited (LBL), which was then split into 13 locally based subsidiaries companies. In the same year, LT also set up the Tendered Bus Division to begin the process of competitive tendering. In a consequence of the Act, LBL had to compete with private bus companies in order to get the right to run public bus transport service. Finally, LBL was sold to private sector in 1994, and all of public bus transport services are run by private companies after that. The introduction of competition for the market and the involvement of the private sector had therefore been gradual in London 6) . The average number of bus passenger in London, carried per day, had increased by 46.92% since 1985, up from 3,124,658 passengers to 5,886,800 passengers in 2008 10) . Most of the increase occurred after the privatization. Moreover, based on his study on the deregulation in bus systems of the UK's metropolitan areas, White found the indication that total operating costs declined by 10.5% in London 11) . The reduction in operating cost had been wholly swallowed up by subsidy cuts and mileage increase 12) . The average number of bus passengers per day in 
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under joint revenue management system, the SMG retains fare revenue, and operators are secured the reimbursement in compliance with total distance of service, according to bus operation each. In addition, in case of shortage, the SMG will subsidize bus operators. Table 2 shows some aspects of competitive tendering and contract system in London and Seoul. Due to the authority retains fare revenue of bus operation then it involves the central pooling of fare revenues, and payments to operators which concerned with the services and performance which is delivered. Consequently, there must be agency that responsible for collecting and distributing it. In London and Seoul, such tasks are carried out by a traffic card company in behalf of authority, in this matter TfL and the SMG.
Under GCC, despite the risk of service productions is transferred to private companies, but then they are still protected from full commercial risk, since revenue risk is born by authority. It is different from net cost contract where operator bears both production and revenue risk. The while under management contract, both production and revenue risk are borne by authority 18) . The type of contracts on the 
basis of the division of risks between contracting parties, both authority and operator, in the provision of public bus transport service can be seen in Table  3 . However, in London, there was an attempt to transfer the both risks to operators under net cost contract, which was applied in preparation for the privatization of its publicly owned company, London Bus Limited (LBL), until routes were tendered. It was not only to shift the revenue risk to the operators but also gave them the incentive to generate more revenue by increasing the quality of the services. Initially this contract system was not subject to competition as the routes were allocated to the incumbent operators by negotiating. However, this trial seemed not successful, and only gross cost contracts have been offered since 1999 19) . Concerned with the contractual form, the time period of contract should be considered as well. Under Quality Incentive Contract, LB signs up the contract with operator for a 5 year contract with the possibility to a 2 year contract extension on the basis of operator's performance. In Seoul, under competitive tendering, all contracts are signed for finite time period of 6 years. The longer contract term will allow for the bidder to offer the low price related to scale economies, but reduce the opportunity for competition amongst potential operators.
(3) Monitoring of bus services
The monitoring is an important part in management cycle, including public transport sector. This is being more significant as the right of operating public transport service is left to some operators. Under a gross cost regime, operators always have an incentive to supply less than the contracted amount of service, so the agreement needs to be enforced 19) . Thus, the establishment of an efficient monitoring system is required to ensure bus services are provided as defined target. Further, it could also be used as feedback for policy formulation and development to provide better public transport services to citizen as users.
As part of efforts to maintain the quantity and quality of public transport service which is provided, there are various monitoring systems which have 14) . tasks, but also to procure the service from operators, manage bus operation, and monitor the service provided by operators. Despite both London and Seoul apply service contract systems under control of local level authority directly, however, the structure of organization which is responsible for planning, procuring, and monitoring the service in those cities emerge in different forms practically. Indeed, it is concerned with the underlying acts and process of the reform itself. All of such functions are held and coordinated by London bus in London. The while, in Seoul, to do so, the SMG is assisted by some specific organizations and competence authority. Moreover, the Seoul Bus Association, who represents the interest of bus companies in Seoul, plays a part in bridging the coordination between bus operators and the SMG.
With the total number of routes which is great, round about 700 routes, LB holds competitive tendering every 2-4 weeks. Therefore, it seems to be reasonably the present of LB as particular organization in handling such functions of public bus transport services in London. This is not only responsible for enforcing continued tendering but also executing other tasks concerning planning, operating, and monitoring of bus service in London.
Under a quasi public system, not all bus routes are put on competitive tendering system in Seoul. As a new concept, part of the reform, competitive tendering was just applied for 19 routes (5.2% of total number of routes), when it was first introduced. It was just applied for trunk lines, while for the feeder lines, public bus service operation is still run by a large number of private companies that work based on agreement with the SMG under joint revenue management. This system is adopted as a new rule in Seoul, results from consensus of the interested parties who involved in the reform process, particularly the SMG and the Seoul Bus Association who played leading roles in the reform process.
Indeed, the establishing of organization to plan, manage and coordinate the whole services should consider the efficiency and effectiveness of its function. Since, it requires additional budget allocation from authority to support the operation of the organization. The choosing of organization form could be associated with task's function and responsibility, including the size of area to be served, the complexity of service, and the usage of kind of technology just like the scientific bus operation system which has been applied in Seoul.
In term of the competitive tendering system as a selection mechanism to designate operators to run public bus services, it has been successful in London. Direct savings from competitive tendering have averaged 15 to 20 percent 21) . In the meantime, London
Transport found that competitively tendered service had generally higher quality, and that when the public operator provided service in a competitive environment (faced with the threat of contract cancellation, like private carriers), service quality improved on the same services 2) . The while, competitive pressure from tendering process leads to situations in which operators must innovate in order to be competitive in the market 22) . This indicates that competitive tendering is not only could increase production cost efficiency through direct saving as a result of its process but also enhance service quality. Further, for the authority it could reduce asymmetry information as some operators offer the best competitive price and quality of service, in order to get the right to run the services on the certain routes.
In the context of monitoring system, in London, under quality incentive contract, the reliability of service, concerning both regularity and punctuality of service provided by operators, is measured by carrying out roadside survey. It is very different as compared to Seoul, which has applied the using of appropriate technology for such functions. By utilizing an intelligent transport system (ITS), global positioning system (GPS), and using a sophisticated fare collection system, it could be conducted effectively. Under this system, authority can also monitor the safety of bus service operations, and analyze the statistic performance of bus companies by utilizing smart card's recorded data and others related information. All of available information will be analyzed by TOPIS, and then used by the SMG as consideration in decision making policy for better service to community as users. This system is not only to help in creating flexible and efficient control over integrated public transport, but also in ensuring demand responsive routing and scheduling, based concrete demand data.
CONCLUSION
This paper focuses on the study of organizing of local public transport service, based on London's and Seoul's experiences. This describes the two previous different systems of public bus operation, which move toward the service contract system, under various rational behind their reform respective. It shows that the previous systems of public bus operation both under public monopoly and unregulated system run by a large number of private companies are allowed for shifting toward such a system.
The changes toward the new arrangement of public bus operation system in those cities were highly concerned with the underlying acts or regulations and the processes which took effect in conducting the reforms themselves. These determined the way of the competence authorities to take initiative to start, perform, and encourage the reform process to come up with their expected goals, and influenced the result itself as well. It became more relevant due to the reform process involved many interested parties.
The separation of planning from operation under gross cost model which are applied in those cities shows the role of involved parties both authority and private operators clearly. Moreover, since authority more focuses on maximizing the service and delegates operational right to provide public bus services to operators, so the availability of an effective organization and appropriate technology become significant in supporting to run and control public bus services. Indeed in applying such a system, the solution adopted by one city cannot be directly transferred to another city. However, it is important to recognize that local circumstance of an area is different individually. Therefore it should be seen and put in particular situation of an area in question, including by linking it with policy objectives of the service provision, as is the case in London and Seoul. The information on service contracts system of their best practices, should be developed and fitted with real situation by making the best use of the advantages, things like competitive tendering system, the utilizing of appropriate technology for planning, managing, and monitoring of service, and considering obstacles to effective service contract system of a certain area, like institutional capacity, the availability of reasonably operators, and the choosing of procurement and contractual type as well.
This study doesn't come to the conclusion of which one is the better of those experiences. It is beyond of the scope of the study, in view of the backgrounds, the former systems, and the processes of change both in London and Seoul were different at all. The stressing is more given to the way of organizing public bus transport service in those cities each. Finally, it could be useful inputs and alternatives in conducting local public transport reform under service contract with public planning.
